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“He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, 
should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite dif-
ferent tasks of politics can only be solved by violence. The genius 
or demon of politics lives in an inner tension with the god of love 
… This tension can at any time lead to an irreconcilable conflict.” 
(Weber 1991 [1919], 126) 
 
This paper explores the way violence is simultaneously ab-
sent and present in our everyday understanding of politics and 
the State. It argues that politics does not have to be an arena 
inherently and unavoidably reliant on the tools of violence. In-
deed, politics could be seen as primarily an arena for violence 
reduction. Social action on violence is one route towards real-
ising such a goal. However, the ontological assumptions about 
human violence behind, for instance, the Weberian approach 
to the modern State remain a conceptual limit to such social 
action. They have provided an apparently intuitive foundation 
for why violence and its monopoly must be coupled to our un-
derstanding of politics and the State. While there have been 
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philosophical challenges to this, they ultimately fail, it is ar-
gued, to provide a focus on violence as a phenomenon with its 
own distinctions. Social action on violence raises new con-
sciousness about its lived experiences and multiple forms, in-
cluding state violence. Such action can influence and be influ-
enced by an emergent epistemological leap in the study of 
violence, made possible by the interdisciplinary potential of 
new knowledge. Over time, there is a source for a new founda-
tion for the State and Politics, which does not rely on the tools 
of violence. 
Weber’s proposition about the impossibility of avoiding vio-
lence in politics and the importance of a state monopoly of 
violence to the modern state remains a reference point not just 
for political scientists but for the real world of politics. It has 
also meant that the violence deeply present in state practices 
and political life in general is often not recognised as such. In 
effect, violence in society can be removed through the creation 
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of a state monopoly which is also “legitimate”. Weber’s atten-
tion to the concept of “legitimacy” was, however, limited or 
what I call “thin”. It means paradoxically, as Schinkel (2010, 
30–31) points out, that “legitimate” violence (potestas) exists 
only by virtue of “non-legitimate” private violence (violentia). 
The modern State’s very existence is based on this distinction 
and its preservation. This limits our capacity to imagine a state 
which reduces violence by virtue of its own non violence. We-
ber’s human ontology of violence has become an intuitive 
“common sense”. While Schinkel himself doubts such a pos-
sibility, this paper argues social action on violence can at least 
begin a process of re-conceptualising the State and political 
life as possible without violence. 
The first part of the paper explores varied efforts to counter 
Weber’s propositions. The most influential of these still rest on 
a human ontology of violence. Violence is better understood 
as a phenomenon, it is argued, “without” politics, in order to 
understand its role “within” politics. Rather than an intrinsic 
and inevitable relationship, we can trace how humans do act 
– and more frequently so in recent decades – to de-sanction 
violence through their social actions, particularly as their sen-
sibilities towards violence increase. Elias (2000) argued that 
sensibilisation was an historical process of “civilisation” in Eu-
rope, involving affect control and self restraint, beginning with 
elites and the monopolisation process. However, such sensi-
bilisation as has occurred took centuries and has remained 
incomplete and even reversible, even more so outside Europe. 
Elias (1998) himself accounts for the collapse of the Weimar 
Republic by the way that an economic and political crisis 
foundered on the structural weakness of its monopoly of vio-
lence. However, this paper argues that violence sensibilities do 
not just “happen” over time, but require active processes of 
what I call emotional enlightenment (Pearce, forthcoming). So-
cial mobilisation creates political possibilities for turning new 
social sensibilities into state action as “law”1, but underpinned 
by social and mental health practices that in turn create the 
conditions to live without violence.  
 
1 Walter Benjamin’s critical exploration of the rela-
tionship of law to violence discussed below, should 
be borne in mind when conceptualising law that 
The second part of the paper is therefore focused on violence 
as a phenomenon subject to social action. An alternative foun-
dation for politics could emerge through such action, alongside 
openness to new knowledge about violence from interdiscipli-
nary insights, in turn opening up new fields for action. From 
philosophy to biology to sociology and history, as well as re-
lated disciplines, violence’s distinctions and particularities 
emerge. We have new tools for comprehending violence and 
the mechanisms of its reproduction. By bringing violence back 
to the body, understood as a social body, it can be distin-
guished from biological aggression. The acts and actions of 
somatic harm that constitute violence are meaning-laden and 
-generating (Pearce, forthcoming). Its effects are transmitted 
and reproduced through time and space (Pearce 2007a). This 
second part of the paper, therefore, explores how the idea of 
the “social body” might enable us to rethink the “body politic”. 
The social body is a body vulnerable (Miller 2002; Bergoffen 
2003; Staudigl 2004, 2013) to physical, emotional and psy-
chic harm. Acknowledging the “vulnerable body” clarifies the 
origins of the intuition around the coupling of violence and pol-
itics. Ongoing somatic impacts of violence in private and public 
social interactions have made it almost natural for politics and 
the State to be structured around our mastering of each other, 
the “domination of man over man” as Weber expressed it. 
Recognising the vulnerable body is not an abstract process. 
Hence, acknowledging the way social action increasingly puts 
this onto the public agenda enables us to imagine a politics 
whose tasks are not best resolved by violence. Such action 
includes, for instance, mobilisation by sections of society 
across more and more cultures against abuse in the intimate 
sphere of social life and naming it as violence. Politics itself 
can become a field where the conditions to live without vio-
lence can be struggled over. As violence is grasped as a phe-
nomenon rather than in selected aspects (Schinkel 2010), its 
inevitable reduction through monopolisation is no longer taken 
for granted. The conceptual decoupling of violence from poli-
tics becomes a possibility through the recognition and expo-
sure of its contingent expressions at various levels and layers 
emerges when the state responds to new social 
sensibilities on violence. 
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of human sociability and social experience. I call this a reverse 
“recoupling” of violence and politics, where violence reduction 
– not its centralised monopolisation – is at the core of political 
life, potentially reshaping the way human affairs are managed. 
 
1. Human Violence in our Foundational Theories of 
Politics and their Critics 
 
1.1. Violence as Legitimated State Violence 
Of course, we should not begin with Weber when talking 
about a violence ontology in politics. The figure who first 
springs to mind is Thomas Hobbes, also writing at a tumultu-
ous moment in history. Hobbes first expressed the intrinsic re-
lationship between humanity’s ever present disposition for vi-
olence and the idea of the sovereign monopoly on coercive 
force. This makes politics possible, he argued (Hobbes 2010, 
89), as well as all the creative and productive pursuits which 
become possible in a “society”. 
Whereas Hobbes wrote against the backcloth of the “early 
modern state” in formation, Weber wrote about the “modern 
state” of the twentieth century, which in turn was a response 
to the formation of nation states from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries, culminating in the First World War of 
1914–1918. In historical hindsight, these “European centu-
ries” and the capacity of Europe over time to contain intrastate 
violence through building up national armies and state taxation 
capacity, gave European political thought a head start in de-
fining what the state is. With much of the world still under Eu-
ropean colonial influence, alongside the socio-political up-
heavals in many parts of the world, and the “American century” 
yet to begin, Weber seemed to offer an insightful and appar-
ently indisputable articulation of how the State and politics 
were inherently configured by the ontological violences of hu-
manity. He also offered a chance to contain them. The State, 
argues Schinkel, became “the people’s means of moral pro-
tection against themselves” (2010, 30). Violence and violence 
reproduction by the State is no longer “violence”, but legiti-
mated protective action. The question is, whether by the be-
ginning of the twenty-first century we cannot do better than 
this. Have we made sufficient theoretical and empirical pro-
gress on rethinking the nexus of violence, politics and the 
State? 
As Andreas Anter (2014, 48) points out in his study of We-
ber’s theory of the modern State, the idea of the state as based 
on command and compliance was the accepted norm when 
Weber wrote. However, Weber believed that rulership was not 
a monopoly of the state and also that all rule requires a basis 
for its legitimacy. He argued that the legitimation of domination 
by the modern state is “by virtue of the belief in the validity of 
legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally 
created rules” (Weber 1991, 79, italics in original). Weber in-
sists on justifications for rule and for the violence that under-
pins it. However, his concept of legitimacy remains deeply 
problematic as a means to do this. In his own words in the text, 
what some translate as “physical violence” (Weber 2000, 
310–11) and others as “physical force” (Weber 1991, 78; Wa-
ters and Waters 2015, 136), is “legitimate” in as much as 
people believe it to be legitimate and believe in the validity of 
the legal statutes. He sought no transcendental conceptuali-
sation of legitimacy. Thus, the violence that the State uses is 
rarely “seen” as violence, but as merely the repertoire of ac-
tions needed for rulership, legitimated by belief in its legality, 
in turn formalised by statute. 
It was not Weber’s intention to “justify” state violence. His 
non-normative approach to “legitimacy” was intended to de-
scribe the basis of acceptance of different forms of rulership. 
However, it is in the name of claims to “legitimacy” that rulers, 
even those backed by legality, use violence. A significant de-
bate took place around these terms in the key inter-war years 
in Germany. For example, Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Vio-
lence was written just a year after Weber wrote Vocation as 
Politics, and was influenced by the same events. It was written 
before Benjamin embraced Marxism in 1924 (Khatib 2016, 
43). Another example is the abidingly influential anti-liberal 
text on Legality and Legitimacy written by Carl Schmitt in 1932, 
just as the Weimar Republic entered the final phase of its po-
litical crisis and violence was escalating. These two thinkers, 
from opposite ends of the political spectrum, illustrate the vul-
nerability of Weber’s efforts to find a liberal political solution 
to ontological violence. Both also assume an ontology of hu-
man violence. 
Walter Benjamin questions the idea that law – whether nat-
ural law or positive law – can ever offer a legitimate justification 
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of violence. In both cases, violence is merely justified in terms 
of the means it offers for a just end (natural law) or in terms of 
the justness of the means used to ensure the end (positive 
law), in other words preservation of the law itself. Thus, law-
making violence and law-preserving violence are both expres-
sions of violence which are not justified or justifiable except as 
means. Violence can be neither a legal nor ethical goal. In his 
Critique of Violence (1978 [1921]), Benjamin was asking 
whether there is a distinction between legitimate and illegiti-
mate violence. This distinction goes to the heart of Weber’s 
effort to legitimate the violence used by the modern State. Ra-
tional legal forms of authority do so through the rules that peo-
ple believe are valid. Yet the phenomenon of violence is ulti-
mately the instrument in all cases, so Benjamin’s question 
(when does violence become law?) means that selectively rec-
ognising some violence as legitimate remains highly problem-
atic. Without straying into Benjamin’s efforts to find grounds 
for a “pure violence”, the key point is that violence as law has 
no more justification when it is used to preserve the law or to 
make the law. Law cannot legitimise violence as a just means 
when that means merely preserves the law. The law is born of 
violence. Violence in the name of state law enforcement under 
elected governments believed to be legitimate is hardly unu-
sual. The “Black Lives Matter” campaign in the United States 
has made it its mission since 2012 to expose selective state 
violence, in just one example from recent history. 
However, the Weberian proposition is vulnerable in other 
ways. What happens when violence is used within (and per-
haps against) the political system and when Weber’s “thin” le-
gitimacy or belief in the state’s monopoly is incapable of pre-
serving it? Violence of multiple kinds grows within political 
systems despite claims to a legitimate state monopoly. As 
commitments to liberal cosmopolitanism and neoliberal glob-
alisation faded in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
this weakness became clearer as populisms of right and left 
sought to re-found the State in relationship to its “enemy”. Lib-
eral democracy increasingly found itself in the middle of polar-
ising narratives, amplified by social media, in which hate and 
threats of violence were commonplace. An article in the UK 
Guardian in July 2016, following the murder of Labour MP Jo 
Cox, and the Brexit vote vividly reflects on the changing lan-
guage of politics in the country that ensued. The journalist 
asked, how did the language of politics get so toxic? He sug-
gested it had to do with something deep and subtly rooted: 
 
a careless, universal conception of politics as a battleground, a 
metaphor so entrenched that we don’t even notice it … What is 
stranger still is the speed with which the old rhetoric of violence 
and confrontation has returned across the political spectrum. On 
the morning of the referendum result, Farage celebrated a victory 
that had been won “without a single bullet being fired”. When 
Thomas Mair, Cox’s alleged killer, appeared in court on Saturday 
18 June, he gave his name as “death to traitors, freedom for Brit-
ain”. Not two weeks later, the term “traitor” was being used by 
some of Jeremy Corbyn’s supporters as a standard term of abuse 
for anyone deemed disloyal. (Bland 2016) 
 
Carl Schmitt’s anti-liberal arguments have gained new reso-
nance in the violent narratives emerging in contemporary lib-
eral orders. Violence, he argued, is always a potential reality, 
but the State must identify the “enemy” (Schmitt 1996). 
Schmitt assumed that humans have a need for domination 
and will kill for their convictions, and liberalism cannot provide 
a form of politics that recognises that. The way of avoiding the 
inevitable enmity and conflict between men and its descent 
into “absolute violence” and ultimately annihilation, is pre-
cisely when the State acts to decide who is the enemy and to 
defeat the enemy without eliminating the friend/foe distinction 
per se (Bernstein 2013, 44). Schmitt uses the potential for 
violence as a reason why the State must assume a sovereign 
role in determining when that should be. He does so in order 
to put forward his argument for the inherent vulnerability of 
parliamentary democracy, which uses legality and illegality as 
arbitrary interpretations of the “empty functionalism of a mere 
arithmetic majority and minority calculation” (Schmitt 2004, 
30). Rather than active consent, legitimacy is for Schmitt 
merely a choice not to resist authority, a right which itself al-
ways raises the latent potential for violence (McCormick 2004, 
xxiv). 
The relevance of Schmitt’s perspective is how it resonates 
with polarised political moments in history, such as our con-
temporary one. Liberal parliamentarianism only offers the pos-
sibility for a heterogeneous plurality of views, he suggests, not 
for an expression of the democratic will. “Every democracy”, he 
argues “rests on the presupposition of the indivisibly similar, 
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entire, unified people, for them there is, then, in fact and in 
essence, no minority and still less a number of firm, permanent 
minorities” (Schmitt 2004, 28). One does not have to agree 
with Schmitt to see how his line of reasoning echoes through 
the decades and could easily find expression in US President 
Trump’s frustration with Congress and with the numerical ques-
tioning of his “popular vote”. And Schmitt left out the impact 
of the rising number of actual assaults and intimidations from 
the right on the socialist representatives in the Weimar Repub-
lic in his attempt to explain the inherent weakness of parlia-
mentary constitutionalism. Violence remains potentially part of 
the repertoire of actual politics, and a thinly legitimised mo-
nopoly within a rule based liberal order does not prevent that.  
 
1.2. From Biopower to Bare Life, from Non-Dominating 
Power to Agonistic Politics: Critiquing and Re-imagining 
the Politics and Violence Nexus 
Weber, Benjamin and Schmitt, reflecting liberal, left and right 
on the political spectrum, accepted the human ontology of vi-
olence and engaged with how political orders emerged from 
that premise. Michel Foucault (1982) argued that violence 
came to be used less and less by the State in Europe as it 
adopted a range of tools to discipline and dominate its sub-
jects. Foucault explored how the State’s use of violence and 
dominating, coercive power evolved into techniques of power, 
and specifically “biopower”, exercised at the level of life rather 
than over the subject’s life and death. Violence, however, al-
most disappears under the weight of his conceptualisation of 
governmentality. It is Giorgio Agamben (1998) who shows that 
violence remains part of the repertoire of sovereign power in 
its foundation and in its control over the living. The political he 
argues (1998, 181) is founded upon the sovereign’s power to 
exclude while including life under its power to kill with impu-
nity, reducing it to “bare life”. It is the sovereign who decides 
the state of exception and the boundary between law and non-
law. This echoes Schmitt, but Agamben is unmasking the dan-
gers of violent sovereign power. The US prison at Guantanamo 
Bay and its detention of alleged terrorists without any legal 
process was the real-life backcloth to his arguments. 
Agamben brings back the ongoing presence of violence in 
politics and the State. Others have challenged the ontology it-
self or created new analytical tools for how politics, the State 
and violence could be re-configured. Hannah Arendt (1970) 
has been the most foundational in terms of her effort to recon-
stitute politics on the basis of power not violence, power con-
ceptualised as its opposite. Arendt suggests that politics need 
not involve either violence or the domination of man over man. 
Arendt’s political world is social, plural and intercommunica-
tive, and formed by power as its “end” unlike violence, which 
is a means forever needing justification. Violence can never be 
legitimate, whereas power emerges through people coming to-
gether, and requires no other legitimation than the reciprocity 
and consensus around its beginning. Her emphasis on power 
as consensus, nevertheless, raises questions of whether her 
approach fails to embrace the inevitable conflicts that, it could 
be argued, are the lifeblood of politics and the pursuit of stra-
tegic goals within it (Habermas 1977, 15).  
Here Chantal Mouffe (2005a, 2005b) steps in to suggest 
that politics could be conceived as a realm of agonism rather 
than antagonism. She is as opposed to Arendt’s understanding 
of the political as a space for freedom and public deliberation, 
as she is to liberalism’s assumption that plural interests can 
be reconciled in the private sphere, leaving the political as a 
neutral sphere of administration. Writing at the turn of the mil-
lennium and at the height of neoliberalism’s rise, when politics 
in the developed economies of the West seemed to be increas-
ingly reduced to an instrumental activity where private interests 
dominated within a framework of apparently neutral proce-
dures, Mouffe was interested in the ongoing real antagonism 
of incommensurable world views. Her agonistic order would 
mobilise political passions, and democracy would offer a ro-
bust space of contention between competing positions on 
questions of poverty and injustice, for example, and the possi-
bility of the construction of a new hegemony. The acceptance 
of such contestations is the legitimate meaning of politics, lim-
iting the resort to violent destructiveness of the political itself. 
However, while violence is an implicit potential of conflict for 
Mouffe, it is not a problematic in its own right. The distinction 
between conflict and violence is not always clear, nor when 
exactly the former might degenerate into the latter. Arendt, on 
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the other hand, has what Frazer and Hutchings (2008, 105) 
argue is an abstract and disembodied account of violence. Ar-
endt challenged the scientists of the 1960s who argued that 
violence was an instinct, and rather viewed rage and the vio-
lence which sometimes accompanied it, as part of a repertoire 
of natural human emotions which enable us also to be moved 
by injustice. Arendt and Mouffe demonstrate that we ought not 
to consider ourselves dependent on Weber for our understand-
ing of politics, the State and violence. We have tools that help 
us to imagine a politics which is built on a non-dominating 
form of power or to imagine an agonistic politics which ac-
counts for human passions but without descending into violent 
enmity capable of destroying political order itself. In neither 
case, however, do we have a satisfactory account of violence. 
Nor is there any acknowledgement of how the violence “out-
side” politics might impact on the conflict inherent in politics, 
understood as strategic action and involving incommensurable 
world views. 
 
2. Violence: A Phenomenon Subject to Social Action 
Weber’s “thin legitimacy” does not provide a means of rec-
ognising the dangers of the state’s violent power over life and 
death. Nor have liberal democratic politics eliminated the risk 
that politics can allow the will of the people to be claimed – 
potentially violently – by a faction, who might win the power of 
the State through media and other techniques that stand out-
side the parliamentary system but are not necessarily illegal. 
We need tools to enable us to recognise the significance of 
persistent violences in the multiple spaces of human sociali-
sation and interaction outside and against the State and how 
they might impact on the way we believe our State has to be 
constructed and how politics is practised. The only way, it is 
argued here, that we can begin to appreciate the ongoing role 
of violence in politics and how to address it, is to focus on 
violence itself. It is to recognise the potent qualities and prop-
erties of violence, not as a human ontology but as something 
which across the socialisation spaces has communicated and 
constructed meanings in human social interactions. Rather 
than see these violences as an inevitable part of human exist-
ence which the State monopoly mitigates, it is argued here that 
those persistent violences are often reproduced by the State, 
while they also limit our capacity to imagine a politics which is 
not shaped by their intractability.  
 
There is historical evidence that the State monopoly, where 
it has worked alongside a functioning rule of law, has reduced 
violence measured in homicides (Elias 2000; Pinker 2011; 
Eisner 2014). However, it has been estimated that only twenty-
five countries and 15 percent of the world’s population live in 
such “open access orders” today (North, Wallis, and Weingast 
2009, xii). And even in such orders where problems of organ-
ised and homicidal violence have diminished, varied forms of 
violence still impact on the private and public spheres. There 
is not space to develop that line of argument further here. Ra-
ther, this article aims to steer our focus onto the necessity of 
unpacking the problematic of violence itself and to question 
our selectivity towards the violences which matter to politics. 
In this context, it is important to see that how the “modern 
semantics of violence” (Schinkel 2010, 31) changes across 
time and culture. It does so, I argue, in an iterative process 
involving greater sensibilisation to violence, leading to social 
action on violence, to greater openness to the new knowledges 
which deepen our understanding of the phenomenon itself, 
and in turn, to further social action. In this way, the paradoxical 
logic that Schinkel identifies by which the State would lose its 
core function without private violence, which is the “bad/evil” 
violence juxtaposed to the “good” violence of the State, grad-
ually disappears (2010, 31). The conceptual possibility of a 
politics without violence can emerge. 
Stephen Pinker (2011, 680–81) highlighted five factors 
which have contributed to the reduction of violence: the Levia-
than (accompanied by Justitia), gentle commerce, feminisa-
tion, the expanding circle of human connections and the esca-
lation of reason. I would argue that what he omits is the active 
agency involved in the naming and de-sanctioning of many 
forms of violence previously unrecognised as such. It was a 
feminist movement that enabled “feminisation” of professional 
and political life to take place, and then for violent experiences 
of women to be taken seriously in the public and political 
realms. From child punishment being recognised as abuse and 
violence, to violence in the domestic sphere being recognised 
as a crime, to rape in war being recognised as unacceptable 
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(yet as normalised as warfare itself), the late twentieth century 
began to show sensitivities to forms of violence unimaginable 
in the past. Social movements, from feminism to victims’ 
movements, and civil society organisations dedicated to hu-
man rights, for example, have played a critical role in opening 
up discussion on these and other expressions of violence. Vi-
olence in its multiple expressions has become a focus of social 
action, and in the process the threshold of acceptance of vio-
lence has lowered, at least in some parts of the world2.  From 
torture and disappearance to bullying and mental health, the 
need for new understandings of the embodied social logics 
and effects of violence have been placed on the public 
agenda. New forms of violence become in this way part of po-
litical debate, demanding political action. Many more remain 
outside it. De-sanctioning tends itself to select aspects of vio-
lence. Only when violence is understood as a phenomenon, 
will these particular acts of de-sanctioning enable violence it-
self to be seen as a tractable human problem rather than an 
ontological one, constitutive of politics and the State. 
 
2.1. The Biology of Aggression and the Sociology of 
Violence 
Getting to grips with the character of violence involves an 
interdisciplinary conversation on how the biology of aggression 
translates into the social body and ultimately the body politic. 
However, nothing exposes the weakness of our interdisciplinary 
conversations more than the study of violence (except perhaps 
the study of peace). In the 1960s, natural scientists tended to 
offer reductionist determinism, while social scientists denied 
that the biological body had any bearing on our social world. 
However, the fields of biology and neuroscience, for instance, 
have made enormous strides in their own engagement with the 
reciprocal impacts of the social and the biological. It is increas-
ingly acknowledged that the biological body is entwined in sys-
tems of social relationships. Genetic and evolutionary expla-
nations which have at times guided thinking on a human 
ontology of violence, are now placed within a range of other 
scientific studies, which reveal the impact of social relation-
 
2 For empirical examples of this see Pearce 
(2007b) and McGee and Pearce (2009). 
ships on our bodies and even our gene expression. Epigenet-
ics, for example, has begun to show that childhood abuse can 
modify DNA to keep genes from being expressed, genes which 
might help in the management of stress, and can explain the 
long-term physical and psychological problems that confront 
such children. Whether and why some abused children be-
come abusers becomes at least a relevant question for the 
study of violence. In this short section, it is not possible to de-
tail all the potential for new conversations between natural and 
social scientists. However, our greater understanding of vio-
lence suggests that it is worth revisiting the human ontology 
arguments and how they impact on our construction of the po-
litical. Not all science necessarily challenges the ontology ar-
gument, of course. Stephen Pinker has also shown that vio-
lence can reduce, but he is also committed to an ultimately 
Hobbesian explanation of its origins. Yet, if we make a distinc-
tion between aggression as a biological impulse and violence 
as a meaning-laden and meaning-generating one, we can 
begin to question the Hobbesian logics that still imbue our pol-
itics. 
Felicity de Zulueta, a biologist, psychotherapist and psychi-
atrist, provides the following summary of the differences be-
tween aggression and violence: 
 
[…] aggression is a form of social behaviour studied by ethol-
ogists, biologists and psychologists, whereas violence is more 
about the interpretation that is given to a form of social behav-
iour, an interpretation that is essentially determined by the social 
context in which we live. At times both terms are interchangeable 
but at other times they are not: an interaction deemed abusive or 
violence in one culture may be considered quite “normal” in an-
other. (2006, 3) 
 
Once we begin to accept that aggression is indeed part of 
our human ontology, but violence is a part of an interpretative 
realm, we begin the journey towards understanding the distinc-
tiveness of violence. Aggression, and our capacity to address 
it, is part of the emotional/cerebral circuits which manage our 
responses to the social world. Our experiences in that world 
generate stored memories of pain and threats. Pathbreaking 
work by psychoanalyst John Bowlby (1971) drew attention to 
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the importance of protection and safety to human survival, 
alongside reproduction and nutrition. He roots attachment in 
evolutionary theory and the gene-determined bias to reduce 
our risk of coming to harm through forming intimate relation-
ships with a sexual partner, parents and offspring (Bowlby 
1998, 90). Such relationships of proximity give humans the 
security to act in the world and to explore it (Holmes 1993, 
67). However, separation and threatened separation generate 
frustration, anxiety and anger. While, in evolutionary terms, 
these emotions are functional to maintaining the intimate re-
lationships, they can easily become distorted in ways that are 
dysfunctional. Bowlby argues that the latter is responsible for 
a great deal of the “maladaptive violence” in families (Bowlby 
1998, 91), while trauma through abuse, deprivation and loss 
can profoundly affect the way we feel and behave (de Zulueta 
2006, 54). 
This intimate space of socialisation is just one where it is 
possible to explore how ruptures in attachment bonds generate 
stress and disrupt the emotional circuits which guide our ca-
pacity to relate to others. Other such spaces would include the 
street, the neighbourhood, the school the prison. Of course, 
this only illustrates a line of enquiry into how the biological and 
social body interact and whether in particular circumstances 
one can trace connections between traumatic experiences in 
childhood and violent responses and actions in adolescence, 
for example. It leads to questions on the temporalities of vio-
lence and its transmission over time and across generations. 
We can also explore the transmission of violence across so-
cial spaces. How do experiences of trauma and violence in the 
intimate space impact on social interactions in other spaces 
such as the street and the school? Without suggesting a crude 
linearity, there is scope for further empirical work on what has 
been called by social scientists a “violence continuum” 
(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). A dialogue between 
the natural and social sciences on violence has become a fruit-
ful one. And this is captured in the following words of biologist 
Debra Niehoff, in which she takes us a step further towards an 
understanding of the distinctiveness of the phenomenon of vi-
olence: 
 
Violence is the failure to respect the boundary between accepta-
ble and unacceptable aggression. If we want to prevent this 
breakdown, to have people reserve their strongest responses for 
true emergencies, we must protect the nervous system from in-
jury, destabilising levels of stress, drugs, isolation and victimisa-
tion. We must strive to create a safe environment flexible enough 
to accommodate some risk taking, structured enough to prevent 
confusion … Behaviour is developed not determined. And be-
cause social behaviours like aggression lie at the cutting edge of 
adaptation to the environment, they are among the behavioural 
elements most open to change. (Niehoff 1999, 261) 
 
By bringing in the idea of a boundary between “acceptable 
and unacceptable aggression”, Niehoff raises the question of 
why violence is recognised as such in differential, culturally 
mediated ways. We give varied meanings to the acts of pain 
on the bodies of others and ourselves. Hurting a child can be 
punishment, discipline or violence. A value-neutral definition 
of violence which assumes that it is recognisably an act of 
physical force which aims to harm is questionable. Acts of 
meaning and judgement are involved, and, legitimation – as in 
Weber’s attempt to legitimate the violence of the State – is 
always “liable to be contested” (Riches 1986, 11). It is the 
social scientists who take up these aspects of violence to open 
the discussion around its meanings. Anthropolgist David 
Riches explores the potency of violence as social and cultural 
resource across cultures, even where there is no word for vio-
lence. He argues that violence is equally efficacious for practi-
cal (instrumental) and symbolic (expressive) purposes (ibid., 
25). That is its potency. And the notion of expressive violence 
leads us towards violence and meaning. Sociologist Randall 
Collins has located the micro-situational meanings of violence 
in the “contours of situations, which shape the emotions and 
acts of the individuals who step inside them” (Collins 2008, 
1) and the way “interaction among several human bodies in 
close communication is quite literally driving their individual 
physiology from the outside in” (Collins 2013, 140). Collins’s 
extensive empirical work brings him to focus on the physicality 
of the moment of violence-making. Literary scholar Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma, who uses sociological research but is not beholden 
to it (Reemtsma 2012, ix), also argues that violence “is first 
and foremost physical violence, the nonconsensual assault on 
another’s body. ‘First and foremost’ means that physical vio-
lence is the point of reference for other, nonphysical forms of 
violence” (ibid., 55). 
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The reduction of violence to its physicality ignores for some 
the misrecognition (Bourdieu 2004) of repeated actions of so-
matic harm not recognised as violence. Yet, Bourdieu also sees 
symbolic violence in physical terms, when he notes the trem-
bling of women who have been persistently subordinated when 
they speak with others (ibid.). Symbolic violence generates 
psychic somatic harm, often manifested physically. Structural 
violence (Galtung 1969) results in many forms of somatic 
harm, for example when a child suffers from avoidable malnu-
trition. The debate on the wider and narrower parameters of 
violence remains unresolved. However, the search beyond def-
initions and causality towards the meanings in violence has 
led to efforts to give violence its distinctive weight and signifi-
cance as a phenomenon. Reemtsma is concerned to under-
stand violence phenomenologically, not in terms of the perpe-
trator or his or her intention, “but the deed in relation to the 
body on which it is inflicted” (ibid., 56–57). The usefulness of 
the phenomenological lens is that it takes us away from the 
selectivity around violence and its particular expressions, such 
as self-directed, interpersonal, collective, private or public. We 
can appreciate why it is that “making sense” of violence seems 
counter-intuitive, and why we so readily allow an entity we call 
“the State” to essentially select for us which violences matter. 
By highlighting the centrality of a world experienced through 
the sensory capacities of the body, phenomenology helps us 
begin the process of making sense of violence from precisely 
that point. As Michael Staudigl argues, such a perspective on 
violence exposes the lived and vulnerable body in the whole 
spectrum of its embodiment, in contrast to the “underexposed 
notion of human corporeality” in most disciplines (2004, 57). 
 
2.2. Violence without Politics: From the Biological to the 
Social Body 
This brief and selective dip into varied disciplinary lenses on 
violence aims to emphasise the richness of the current debate 
and how far it has travelled since 1919. It also brings us to to 
the matter of conceiving a way of thinking about violence which 
could give it a centrality of its own. This underlines the inca-
pacity of politics as currently conceptualised and practised to 
offer a route to reducing it in all its forms and expressions. 
Violence must be recognised not only as meaning-laden, but 
also as meaning-generating. 
Violence belongs to our sense-making bodily selves, with or-
igins in our social body. Its distinctiveness has to be sought in 
the fact that an act or action of pain or harm to the body of 
self or other is literally not senseless. As phenomenologist, 
James Dodd writes: “violence is situated in a world of sense, 
but in a manner that seems to hold it apart from sense” (2009, 
15). Violence brings a rupture in our sense-making, but that 
itself enables its perpetrator to communicate something about 
the world to the victim. Our difficulty of expressing pain in lan-
guage tells us a great deal about the potency of its communi-
cative power: “Physical pain does not simply resist language 
but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion 
to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a hu-
man being makes before language is learned” (Scarry 1985, 
4). Some have argued that violence not only communicates 
meaning but that it generates meaning and goes beyond a 
mean-ends continuum, that violence is autotelic (for example 
Schinkel 2010). The notion that violence could generate its 
own sense is strengthened by the example of the Islamic State 
suicide bombers. These mostly young men appear to generate 
meaning in their own lives as well as in the world they aim to 
re-found, through an act of self-annihilation and social de-
struction. Another way that violence could be understood to 
generate sense is the way, as Schinkel notes, “many people 
feel drawn to violence because violence itself can give pleas-
ure” (2010, 122). He links this to the pervasiveness of “fric-
tional violence” (ibid., 129), straddling the real and the fic-
tional worlds, where many will encounter violence on a daily 
basis even when they live in varying degrees of threat of actual 
violence. 
The differential meanings borne by and generated through 
violence for women and men are also part of the story of its 
distinctiveness as a phenomenon. While women do commit 
homicides, it could be argued that violence does not have the 
identity-affirming character for women that it does for men. In-
deed, women tend to be more female the less violent they are, 
which is the opposite for men. Men fulfil expectations of mas-
culinity by acting violently (Pearce 2007a). Much of Norbert 
Elias’s civilising story of violence decline is a story of male-on-
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male interpersonal violence. It could not be understood with-
out discussions of shame and honour in the male social psy-
che and the ease with which violence communicates meanings 
around these norms. The statistics on male-on male-violence 
continue to tell a story whose significance is best acknowl-
edged through an appreciation of the differentiated gendered 
meanings of violence:  
 
Fatal violence is not distributed evenly among sex and age 
groups. Males account for 82% of all homicide victims and have 
estimated rates of homicide that are more than four times those 
of females (10.8 and 2.5, respectively, per 100,000). … The 
highest estimated rates of homicide in the world are found among 
males aged 15–29 years (18.2 per 100,000), followed closely 
by males aged 30–44 years (15.7 per 100,000). Estimated rates 
of homicide among females range from 1.2 per 100,000 in ages 
5–14 years, to 3.2 per 100,000 in the age group 15–29 years. 
(WHO 2014) 
 
In Latin America, a new word – feminicide – began to be used 
in the new millennium to make visible the differential meanings 
of killing women rather than men. If the killing of women (fem-
icide) is mostly hidden in the homicide statistics, this is even 
more true of the killing of women because they are women 
(feminicide). This new addition to the lexicon of violence is due 
to the breaking of silences and the accumulated social action 
on violence which gathered pace in the late twentieth century. 
 
3. Conclusion: The Politicisation of Violence in a Reverse 
Re-coupling 
We are ready to move away from contested claims about le-
gitimacy and violence, with the State being defined through its 
claim to a successful monopoly of its legitimate use. A politics 
which assumes a human ontology of violence contained by a 
“legitimate” State monopoly has enabled the State to decide 
which violences are criminal and pathological, but leaving 
many unrecognised or misrecognised (Bourdieu 2004). Not 
only is our politics unable to address the multiple expressions 
of the phenomenon of violence, it is also vulnerable to their 
use and misuse by the State and those seeking state power. 
At the time of writing this paper, there was mounting evidence 
of state and non-state violence impacting on the electoral pro-
cess itself, for example anti-Semitic attacks, racist abuse and 
death threats to UK politicians during the June 2017 election; 
the torture and murder of a senior Kenyan election official just 
prior to the July 2017 election; in Venezuela, the deaths of 
fourteen people in clashes with security forces during voting for 
President Maduro’s controversial constitutional assembly also 
in July 2017. 
If violence as a phenomenon becomes a central political is-
sue, taking into account new knowledge about the social 
mechanisms of its reproduction, a case could be made that 
politics and the State should be the arena for addressing it 
rather than monopolising it. The idea of a central monopoly 
appeals intuitively, particularly when such monopoly is actively 
contested. It could be argued some form of enforcement, and 
thus violence as law, will be needed as violence sensibilities 
expose more aspects of violence and until our sensibilities to-
wards violence challenge our understandings of revenge and 
punishment. However, to define the State through monopoli-
sation ignores the history of violence reproduction, as well as 
reduction over time of some violences in some contexts, that 
this has entailed. The focus on what the State is and the tools 
politics should employ should not rely on its relationship to 
violence per se, but to how it builds the conditions to live with-
out violence. A politics which begins from the vulnerability of 
the social body to the impacts of varied forms of somatic harm 
would offer a conceptual foundation more attuned with the 
most recent knowledge of violence. From within politics, the 
recognition that violence inhibits participation, preserves ine-
quality – which, in turn, correlates with violence (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2011 ) – and distorts if not destroys democracy, could 
lead to the politicisation of violence as a central concern of 
politics and the State, but one which does not constitute ei-
ther. 
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